19691103 President Nixon’s Silent Majority Speech

President Nixon's Silent Majority Speech

It was on this date, November 3^rd, 1969, that President Nixon gave his “Silent Majority” speech. I found here on the “www.vietnamwar.com” web site:

President Nixon's Silent Majority Speech

President Richard M. Nixon - November 3, 1969

Good evening, my fellow Americans:

Tonight I want to talk to you on a subject of deep concern to all Americans and to many people in all parts of the world--the war in Vietnam.

I believe that one of the reasons for the deep division about Vietnam is that many Americans have lost confidence in what their Government has told them about our policy. The American people cannot and should not be asked to support a policy which involves the overriding issues of war and peace unless they know the truth about that policy.

Tonight, therefore, I would like to answer some of the questions that I know are on the minds of many of you listening to me.

How and why did America get involved in Vietnam in the first place?

How has this administration changed the policy of the previous administration?

What has really happened in the negotiations in Paris and on the battlefront in Vietnam?

What choices do we have if we are to end the war?

What are the prospects for peace?

Now, let me begin by describing the situation I found when I was inaugurated on January 20:

The war had been going on for 4 years; 31,000 Americans had been killed in action; The training program for the South Vietnamese was behind schedule; 540,000 Americans were in Vietnam with no plans to reduce the number; No progress had been made at the negotiations in Paris and the United States had not put forth a comprehensive peace proposal; The war was causing deep division at home and criticism from many of our friends as well as our enemies abroad.

In view of these circumstances there were some who urged that I end the war at once by ordering the immediate withdrawal of all American forces.

From a political standpoint this would have been a popular and easy course to follow. After all, we became involved in the war while my predecessor was in office. I could blame the defeat which would be the result of my action on him and come out as the Peacemaker. Some put it to me quite bluntly: This was the only way to avoid allowing Johnsons war to become Nixon's war.

But I had a greater obligation than to think only of the years of my administration and of the next election. I had to think of the effect of my decision on the next generation and on the future of peace and freedom in America and in the world.

Let us all understand that the question before us is not whether some Americans are for peace and some Americans are against peace. The question at issue is not whether Johnson's war becomes Nixon's war.

The great question is: How can we win America's peace?

Well, let us turn now to the fundamental issue. Why and how did the United States become involved in Vietnam in the first place?

Fifteen years ago North Vietnam, with the logistical support of Communist China and the Soviet Union, launched a campaign to impose a Communist government on South Vietnam by instigating and supporting a revolution.

In response to the request of the Government of South Vietnam, President Eisenhower sent economic aid and military equipment to assist the people of South Vietnam in their efforts to prevent a Communist takeover. Seven years ago, President Kennedy sent 16,000 military personnel to Vietnam as combat advisers. Four years ago, President Johnson sent American combat forces to South Vietnam.

Now, many believe that President Johnsons decision to send American combat forces to South Vietnam was wrong. And many others-I among them-have been strongly critical of the way the war has been conducted.

But the question facing us today is: Now that we are in the war, what is the best way to end it?

In January I could only conclude that the precipitate withdrawal of American forces from Vietnam would be a disaster not only for South Vietnam but for the United States and for the cause of peace.

For the South Vietnamese, our precipitate withdrawal would inevitably allow the Communists to repeat the massacres which followed their takeover in the North 15 years before.

They then murdered more than 50,000 people and hundreds of thousands more died in slave labor camps.

We saw a prelude of what would happen in South Vietnam when the Communists entered the city of Hue last year. During their brief rule there, there was a bloody reign of terror in which 3,000 civilians were clubbed, shot to death, and buried in mass graves.

With the sudden collapse of our support, these atrocities of Hue would become the nightmare of the entire nation-and particularly for the million and a half Catholic refugees who fled to South Vietnam when the Communists took over in the North.

For the United States, this first defeat in our Nation's history would result in a collapse of confidence in American leadership, not only in Asia but throughout the world.

Three American Presidents have recognized the great stakes involved in Vietnam and understood what had to be done.

In 1963, President Kennedy, with his characteristic eloquence and clarity, said: ". . . we want to see a stable government there, carrying on a struggle to maintain its national independence.

"We believe strongly in that. We are not going to withdraw from that effort. In my opinion, for us to withdraw from that effort would mean a collapse not only of South Viet-Nam, but Southeast Asia. So we are going to stay there."

President Eisenhower and President Johnson expressed the same conclusion during their terms of office.

For the future of peace, precipitate withdrawal would thus be a disaster of immense magnitude.

A nation cannot remain great if it betrays its allies and lets down its friends.

Our defeat and humiliation in South Vietnam without question would promote recklessness in the councils of those great powers who have not yet abandoned their goals of world conquest.

This would spark violence wherever our commitments help maintain the peace-in the Middle East, in Berlin, eventually even in the Western Hemisphere.

Ultimately, this would cost more lives.

It would not bring peace; it would bring more war.

For these reasons, I rejected the recommendation that I should end the war by immediately withdrawing all of our forces. I chose instead to change American policy on both the negotiating front and battlefront.

In order to end a war fought on many fronts, I initiated a pursuit for peace on many fronts.

In a television speech on May 14, in a speech before the United Nations, and on a number of other occasions I set forth our peace proposals in great detail.

We have offered the complete withdrawal of all outside forces within 1 year.

We have proposed a cease-fire under international supervision.

We have offered free elections under international supervision with the Communists participating in the organization and conduct of the elections as an organized political force. And the Saigon Government has pledged to accept the result of the elections.

We have not put forth our proposals on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. We have indicated that we are willing to discuss the proposals that have been put forth by the other side. We have declared that anything is negotiable except the right of the people of South Vietnam to determine their own future. At the Paris peace conference, Ambassador Lodge has demonstrated our flexibility and good faith in 40 public meetings.

Hanoi has refused even to discuss our proposals. They demand our unconditional acceptance of their terms, which are that we withdraw all American forces immediately and unconditionally and that we overthrow the Government of South Vietnam as we leave.

We have not limited our peace initiatives to public forums and public statements. I recognized, in January, that a long and bitter war like this usually cannot be settled in a public forum. That is why in addition to the public statements and negotiations I have explored every possible private avenue that might lead to a settlement.

Tonight I am taking the unprecedented step of disclosing to you some of our other initiatives for peace-initiatives we undertook privately and secretly because we thought we thereby might open a door which publicly would be closed.

I did not wait for my inauguration to begin my quest for peace.

Soon after my election, through an individual who is directly in contact on a personal basis with the leaders of North Vietnam, I made two private offers for a rapid, comprehensive settlement. Hanoi's replies called in effect for our surrender before negotiations.

Since the Soviet Union furnishes most of the military equipment for North Vietnam, Secretary of State Rogers, my Assistant for National Security Affairs, Dr. Kissinger, Ambassador Lodge, and I, personally, have met on a number of occasions with representatives of the Soviet Government to enlist their assistance in getting meaningful negotiations started. In addition, we have had extended discussions directed toward that same end with representatives of other governments which have diplomatic relations with North Vietnam. None of these initiatives have to date produced results.

In mid-July, I became convinced that it was necessary to make a major move to break the deadlock in the Paris talks. I spoke directly in this office, where I am now sitting, with an individual who had known Ho Chi Minh [President, Democratic Republic of Vietnam] on a personal basis for 25 years. Through him I sent a letter to Ho Chi Minh.

I did this outside of the usual diplomatic channels with the hope that with the necessity of making statements for propaganda removed, there might be constructive progress toward bringing the war to an end. Let me read from that letter to you now.

"Dear Mr. President:

"I realize that it is difficult to communicate meaningfully across the gulf of four years of war. But precisely because of this gulf, I wanted to take this opportunity to reaffirm in all solemnity my desire to work for a just peace. I deeply believe that the war in Vietnam has gone on too long and delay in bringing it to an end can benefit no one-least of all the people of Vietnam. . . .

"The time has come to move forward at the conference table toward an early resolution of this tragic war. You will find us forthcoming and open-minded in a common effort to bring the blessings of peace to the brave people of Vietnam. Let history record that at this critical juncture, both sides turned their face toward peace rather than toward conflict and war."

I received Ho Chi Minhs reply on August 30, 3 days before his death. It simply reiterated the public position North Vietnam had taken at Paris and flatly rejected my initiative.

The full text of both letters is being released to the press.

In addition to the public meetings that I have referred to, Ambassador Lodge has met with Vietnam's chief negotiator in Paris in II private sessions.

We have taken other significant initiatives which must remain secret to keep open some channels of communication which may still prove to be productive.

But the effect of all the public, private, and secret negotiations which have been undertaken since the bombing halt a year ago and since this administration came into office on January 20, can be summed up in one sentence: No progress whatever has been made except agreement on the shape of the bargaining table.

Well now, who is at fault?

It has become clear that the obstacle in negotiating an end to the war is not the President of the United States. It is not the South Vietnamese Government.

The obstacle is the other side's absolute refusal to show the least willingness to join us in seeking a just peace. And it will not do so while it is convinced that all it has to do is to wait for our next concession, and our next concession after that one, until it gets everything it wants.

There can now be no longer any question that progress in negotiation depends only on Hanoi's deciding to negotiate, to negotiate seriously.

I realize that this report on our efforts on the diplomatic front is discouraging to the American people, but the American people are entitled to know the truth-the bad news as well as the good news where the lives of our young men are involved.

Now let me turn, however, to a more encouraging report on another front.

At the time we launched our search for peace I recognized we might not succeed in bringing an end to the war through negotiation. I, therefore, put into effect another plan to bring peace-a plan which will bring the war to an end regardless of what happens on the negotiating front.

It is in line with a major shift in U.S. foreign policy which I described in my press conference at Guam on July, 25. Let me briefly explain what has been described as the Nixon Doctrine-a policy which not only will help end the war in Vietnam, but which is an essential element of our program to prevent future Vietnams.

We Americans are a do-it-yourself people. We are an impatient people. Instead of teaching someone else to do a job, we like to do it ourselves. And this trait has been carried over into our foreign policy.

In Korea and again in Vietnam, the United States furnished most of the money, most of the arms, and most of the men to help the people of those countries defend their freedom against Communist aggression.

Before any American troops were committed to Vietnam, a leader of another Asian country expressed this opinion to me when I was traveling in Asia as a private citizen. He said: "When you are trying to assist another nation defend its freedom, U.S. policy should be to help them fight the war but not to fight the war for them."

Well, in accordance with this wise counsel, I laid down in Guam three principles as guidelines for future American policy toward Asia:

First, the United States will keep all of its treaty commitments.

Second, we shall provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens the freedom of a nation allied with us or of a nation whose survival we consider vital to our security.

Third, in cases involving other types of aggression, we shall furnish military and economic assistance when requested in accordance with our treaty commitments. But we shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its defense.

After I announced this policy, I found that the leaders of the Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, South Korea, and other nations which might be threatened by Communist aggression, welcomed this new direction in American foreign policy.

The defense of freedom is everybody's business-not just Americas business. And it is particularly the responsibility of the people whose freedom is threatened. In the previous administration, we Americanized the war in Vietnam. In this administration, we are Vietnamizing the search for peace.

The policy of the previous administration not only resulted in our assuming the primary responsibility for fighting the war, but even more significantly did not adequately stress the goal of strengthening the South Vietnamese so that they could defend themselves when we left.

The Vietnamization plan was launched following Secretary Laird's visit to Vietnam in March. Under the plan, I ordered first a substantial increase in the training and equipment of South Vietnamese forces.

In July, on my visit to Vietnam, I changed General Abrams orders so that they were consistent with the objectives of our new policies. Under the new orders, the primary mission of our troops is to enable the South Vietnamese forces to assume the full responsibility for the security of South Vietnam.

Our air operations have been reduced by over 20 percent.

And now we have begun to see the results of this long overdue change in American policy in Vietnam: After 5 years of Americans going into Vietnam, we are finally bringing American men home. By December 15, over 60,000 men will have been withdrawn from South Vietnam-including 20 percent of all of our combat forces. The South Vietnamese have continued to gain in strength. As a result they have been able to take over combat responsibilities from our American troops.

Two other significant developments have occurred since this administration took office: Enemy infiltration, infiltration which is essential if they are to launch a major attack, over the last 3 months is less than 20 percent of what it was over the same period last year. Most important-United States casualties have declined during the last 2 months to the lowest point in 3 years.

Let me now turn to our program for the future.

We have adopted a plan which we have worked out in cooperation with the South Vietnamese for the complete withdrawal of all U.S. combat ground forces, and their replacement by South Vietnamese forces on an orderly scheduled timetable. This withdrawal will be made from strength and not from weakness. As South Vietnamese forces become stronger, the rate of American withdrawal can become greater.

I have not and do not intend to announce the timetable for our program. And there are obvious reasons for this decision which I am sure you will understand. As I have indicated on several occasions, the rate of withdrawal will depend on developments on three fronts.

One of these is the progress which can be or might be made in the Paris talks. An announcement of a fixed timetable for our withdrawal would completely remove any incentive for the enemy to negotiate an agreement. They would simply wait until our forces had withdrawn and then move in.

The other two factors on which we will base our withdrawal decisions are the level of enemy activity and the progress of the training programs of the South Vietnamese forces. And I am glad to be able to report tonight progress on both of these fronts has been greater than we anticipated when we started the program in June for withdrawal. As a result, our timetable for withdrawal is more optimistic now than when we made our first estimates in June. Now, this clearly demonstrates why it is not wise to be frozen in on a fixed timetable.

We must retain the flexibility to base each withdrawal decision on the situation as it is at that time rather than on estimates that are no longer valid.

Along with this optimistic estimate, I must-in all candor-leave one note of caution.

If the level of enemy activity significantly increases we might have to adjust our timetable accordingly.

However, I want the record to be completely clear on one point.

At the time of the bombing halt just a year ago, there was some confusion as to whether there was an understanding on the part of the enemy that if we stopped the bombing of North Vietnam they would stop the shelling of cities in South Vietnam. I want to be sure that there is no misunderstanding on the part of the enemy with regard to our withdrawal Program.

We have noted the reduced level of infiltration, the reduction of our casualties, and are basing our withdrawal decisions partially on those factors.

If the level of infiltration or our casualties increase while we are trying to scale down the fighting, it will be the result of a conscious decision by the enemy.

Hanoi could make no greater mistake than to assume that an increase in violence will be to its advantage. If I conclude that increased enemy action jeopardizes our remaining forces in Vietnam, I shall not hesitate to take strong and effective measures to deal with that situation.

This is not a threat. This is a statement of policy, which as Commander in Chief of our Armed Forces, I am making in meeting my responsibility for the protection of American fighting men wherever they may be.

My fellow Americans, I am sure you can recognize from what I have said that we really only have two choices open to us if we want to end this war: I can order an immediate, precipitate withdrawal of all Americans from Vietnam without regard to the effects of that action. Or we can persist in our search for a just peace through a negotiated settlement if possible, or through continued implementation of our plan for Vietnamization if necessary-a plan in which we will withdraw all of our forces from Vietnam on a schedule in accordance with our program, as the South Vietnamese become strong enough to defend their own freedom.

I have chosen this second course.

It is not the easy way.

It is the right way.

It is a plan which will end the war and serve the cause of peace-not just in Vietnam but in the Pacific and in the world.

In speaking of the consequences of a precipitate withdrawal, I mentioned that our allies would lose confidence in America.

Far more dangerous, we would lose confidence in ourselves. Oh, the immediate reaction would be a sense of relief that our men were coming home. But as we saw the consequences of what we had done, inevitable remorse and divisive recrimination would scar our spirit as a people.

We have faced other crisis in our history and have become stronger by rejecting the easy way out and taking the right way in meeting our challenges. Our greatness as a nation has been our capacity to do what had to be done when we knew our course was right.

I recognize that some of my fellow citizens disagree with the plan for peace I have chosen. Honest and patriotic Americans have reached different conclusions as to how peace should be achieved.

In San Francisco a few weeks ago, I saw demonstrators carrying signs reading: "Lose in Vietnam, bring the boys home."

Well, one of the strengths of our free society is that any American has a right to reach that conclusion and to advocate that point of view. But as President of the United States, I would be untrue to my oath of office if I allowed the policy of this Nation to be dictated by the minority who hold that point of view and who try to impose it on the Nation by mounting demonstrations in the street.

For almost 200 years, the policy of this Nation has been made under our Constitution by those leaders in the Congress and the White House elected by all of the people. If a vocal minority, however fervent its cause, prevails over reason and the will of the majority, this Nation has no future as a free society.

And now I would like to address a word, if I may, to the young people of this Nation who are particularly concerned, and I understand why they are concerned, about this war.

I respect your idealism.

I share your concern for peace.

I want peace as much as you do.

There are powerful personal reasons I want to end this war. This week I will have to sign 83 letters to mothers, fathers, wives, and loved ones of men who have given their lives for America in Vietnam. It is very little satisfaction to me that this is only one-third as many letters as I signed the first week in office. There is nothing I want more than to see the day come when I do not have to write any of those letters.

I want to end the war to save the lives of those brave young men in Vietnam. But I want to end it in a way which will increase the chance that their younger brothers and their sons will not have to fight in some future Vietnam someplace in the world. And I want to end the war for another reason. I want to end it so that the energy and dedication of you, our young people, now too often directed into bitter hatred against those responsible for the war, can be turned to the great challenges of peace, a better life for all Americans, a better life for all people on this earth.

I have chosen a plan for peace. I believe it will succeed.

If it does succeed, what the critics say now won't matter. If it does not succeed, anything I say then won't matter.

I know it may not be fashionable to speak of patriotism or national destiny these days. But I feel it is appropriate to do so on this occasion

Two hundred years ago this Nation was weak and poor. But even then, America was the hope of millions in the world. Today we have become the strongest and richest nation in the world. And the wheel of destiny has turned so that any hope the world has for the survival of peace and freedom will be determined by whether the American people have the moral stamina and the courage to meet the challenge of free world leadership.

Let historians not record that when America was the most powerful nation in the world we passed on the other side of the road and allowed the last hopes for peace and freedom of millions of people to be suffocated by the forces of totalitarianism.

And so tonight-to you, the great silent majority of my fellow Americans. I ask for your support.

I pledged in my campaign for the Presidency to end the war in a way that we could win the peace. I have initiated a plan of action which will enable me to keep that pledge.

The more support I can have from the American people, the sooner that pledge can be redeemed; for the more divided we are at home, the less likely, the enemy is to negotiate at Paris.

Let us be united for peace. Let us also be united against defeat. Because let us understand: North Vietnam cannot defeat or humiliate the United States. Only Americans can do that.

Fifty years ago, in this room and at this very desk, President Woodrow Wilson spoke words which caught the imagination of a war-weary world. He said: "This is the war to end war." His dream for peace after World War I was shattered on the hard realities of great power politics and Woodrow Wilson died a broken man.

Tonight I do not tell you that the war in Vietnam is the war to end wars. But I do say this: I have initiated a plan which Will end this war in a way that will bring us closer to that great goal to which Woodrow Wilson and every American President in our history has been dedicated-the goal of a just and lasting peace.

As President I hold the responsibility for choosing the best path to that goal and then leading the Nation along it.

I pledge to you tonight that I shall meet this responsibility with all of the strength and wisdom I can command in accordance with your hopes, mindful of your concerns, sustained by your prayers.

Thank you and goodnight.

President Richard M. Nixon - November 3, 1969

19480507 Westminster City Election

Westminster City Election

Democratic Advocate, May 7, 1948.

City Election Monday—Another selection of importance will be held Monday, May 10, from 7 a.m. to 7 p.m. in the Firemen's building in the City of Westminster.

The voters will mark their ballots for Mayor Joseph L. Mathias and his councilmen, Scott Bair and Jesse Royer.

The term is for two years. Our city is one of the best governed in the state. Fine streets, parking ground, playground, comfort station, fine thoroughfares, etc., at the cost of $1.00 tax a year.

Now show your appreciation by voting for these candidates. They have no opposition, but that should not keep any voter home.

For more information: Elections History Westminster

History Westminster,

October 4, 1963 Elon Has New Dean of Men - Dr. James H. Overton, Jr

October 4, 1963 Elon Has New Dean of Men - Dr. James H. Overton, Jr

Maroon and Gold

October 4, 1963

http://kevindayhoff.blogspot.com/1973/10/october-4-1963-elon-has-new-dean-of-men.html 

Dr. James H. Overton, Jr., a native of North Carolina, who has had wide experience in both educational and religious work, is the new dean of men at Elon College, having assumed his new duties with the opening of the 1963-64 college year.

Dr. Overton, who was born in eastern North Carolina, received his undergraduate training at the University of North Carolina and then attended the Divinity School of Duke University, where he received his Ph.D. degree.

He has since earned his doctorate at Duke in the field of church history. He comes to the Elon position from Nashville, Tenn., where he has been with the Board of Evangelism of the Methodist Church for the past three years.

He had previously taught at Lambuth College in Jackson, Tenn., had done religious work with students at both Duke University and N. C. State College and has held a number of Methodist pastoral appointments.

In connection with his work in education and religion, Dr. Overton holds memberships in Pi Gamma Mu, honorary social science group; International Society of Theta Pi, honorary ministerial organization: American Society of Church History and National Association of Biblical Instructors.

*****

Kevin Dayhoff Soundtrack: http://kevindayhoff.blogspot.com/ = http://www.kevindayhoff.net/ Kevin Dayhoff Art: http://kevindayhoffart.blogspot.com/ or http://kevindayhoffart.com/ = http://www.kevindayhoff.com/ Kevin Dayhoff Westminster: http://kevindayhoffwestgov-net.blogspot.com/ or http://www.westgov.net/ = www.kevindayhoff.org Twitter: https://twitter.com/kevindayhoff Twitpic: http://twitpic.com/photos/kevindayhoff Kevin Dayhoff's The New Bedford Herald: http://kbetrue.livejournal.com/ = www.newbedfordherald.net Explore Carroll: www.explorecarroll.com The Tentacle: www.thetentacle.com

1958-ish Bow tie and hat at 306 East Green St., in Westminster

1958-ish Bow tie and hat at 306 East Green St., in Westminster

Kevin Dayhoff

19580000ish-Ked-Bowtie-and-.gif

Dayhoff photo gallery

U.S. Constitution: Article I

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Article I

Article Text | Annotations

Section 1.

All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.

Section 2.

The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several States, and the Electors in each State shall have the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature.

No Person shall be a Representative who shall not have attained to the age of twenty five Years, and been seven Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State in which he shall be chosen.

Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several States which may be included within this Union, according to their respective Numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole Number of free Persons, including those bound to Service for a Term of Years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other Persons. The actual Enumeration shall be made within three Years after the first Meeting of the Congress of the United States, and within every subsequent Term of ten Years, in such Manner as they shall by Law direct. The Number of Representatives shall not exceed one for every thirty Thousand, but each State shall have at Least one Representative; and until such enumeration shall be made, the State of New Hampshire shall be entitled to chuse three, Massachusetts eight, Rhode-Island and Providence Plantations one, Connecticut five, New-York six, New Jersey four, Pennsylvania eight, Delaware one, Maryland six, Virginia ten, North Carolina five, South Carolina five, and Georgia three.

When vacancies happen in the Representation from any State, the Executive Authority thereof shall issue Writs of Election to fill such Vacancies.

The House of Representatives shall chuse their Speaker and other Officers; and shall have the sole Power of Impeachment.

Section 3.

The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each State, chosen by the Legislature thereof, for six Years; and each Senator shall have one Vote.

Immediately after they shall be assembled in Consequence of the first Election, they shall be divided as equally as may be into three Classes. The Seats of the Senators of the first Class shall be vacated at the Expiration of the second Year, of the second Class at the Expiration of the fourth Year, and of the third Class at the Expiration of the sixth Year, so that one third may be chosen every second Year; and if Vacancies happen by Resignation, or otherwise, during the Recess of the Legislature of any State, the Executive thereof may make temporary Appointments until the next Meeting of the Legislature, which shall then fill such Vacancies.

No Person shall be a Senator who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty Years, and been nine Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State for which he shall be chosen.

The Vice President of the United States shall be President of the Senate but shall have no Vote, unless they be equally divided.

The Senate shall chuse their other Officers, and also a President pro tempore, in the Absence of the Vice President, or when he shall exercise the Office of President of the United States.

The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments. When sitting for that Purpose, they shall be on Oath or Affirmation. When the President of the United States is tried the Chief Justice shall preside: And no Person shall be convicted without the Concurrence of two thirds of the Members present.

Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the United States: but the Party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment, according to Law.

Section 4.

The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators.

The Congress shall assemble at least once in every Year, and such Meeting shall be on the first Monday in December, unless they shall by Law appoint a different Day.

Section 5.

Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members, and a Majority of each shall constitute a Quorum to do Business; but a smaller Number may adjourn from day to day, and may be authorized to compel the Attendance of absent Members, in such Manner, and under such Penalties as each House may provide.

Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly Behaviour, and, with the Concurrence of two thirds, expel a Member.

Each House shall keep a Journal of its Proceedings, and from time to time publish the same, excepting such Parts as may in their Judgment require Secrecy; and the Yeas and Nays of the Members of either House on any question shall, at the Desire of one fifth of those Present, be entered on the Journal.

Neither House, during the Session of Congress, shall, without the Consent of the other, adjourn for more than three days, nor to any other Place than that in which the two Houses shall be sitting.

Section 6.

The Senators and Representatives shall receive a Compensation for their Services, to be ascertained by Law, and paid out of the Treasury of the United States. They shall in all Cases, except Treason, Felony and Breach of the Peace, be privileged from Arrest during their Attendance at the Session of their respective Houses, and in going to and returning from the same; and for any Speech or Debate in either House, they shall not be questioned in any other Place.

No Senator or Representative shall, during the Time for which he was elected, be appointed to any civil Office under the Authority of the United States, which shall have been created, or the Emoluments whereof shall have been encreased during such time; and no Person holding any Office under the United States, shall be a Member of either House during his Continuance in Office.

Section 7.

All Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments as on other Bills.

Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a law, be presented to the President of the United States: If he approve he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it, with his Objections to that House in which it shall have originated, who shall enter the Objections at large on their Journal, and proceed to reconsider it. If after such Reconsideration two thirds of that House shall agree to pass the Bill, it shall be sent, together with the Objections, to the other House, by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two thirds of that House, it shall become a Law. But in all such Cases the Votes of both Houses shall be determined by Yeas and Nays, and the Names of the Persons voting for and against the Bill shall be entered on the Journal of each House respectively. If any Bill shall not be returned by the President within ten Days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to him, the Same shall be a Law, in like Manner as if he had signed it, unless the Congress by their Adjournment prevent its Return, in which Case it shall not be a Law

Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the Concurrence of the Senate and House of Representatives may be necessary (except on a question of Adjournment) shall be presented to the President of the United States; and before the Same shall take Effect, shall be approved by him, or being disapproved by him, shall be repassed by two thirds of the Senate and House of Representatives, according to the Rules and Limitations prescribed in the Case of a Bill.

Section 8.

The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States;

To borrow Money on the credit of the United States;

To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes;

To establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization, and uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States;

To coin Money, regulate the Value thereof, and of foreign Coin, and fix the Standard of Weights and Measures;

To provide for the Punishment of counterfeiting the Securities and current Coin of the United States;

To establish Post Offices and post Roads;

To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries;

To constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court;

To define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offences against the Law of Nations;

To declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water;

To raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two Years;

To provide and maintain a Navy;

To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces;

To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions;

To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States, reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress;

To exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding ten Miles square) as may, by Cession of Particular States, and the Acceptance of Congress, become the Seat of the Government of the United States, and to exercise like Authority over all Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in which the Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards and other needful Buildings;--And

To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.

Section 9.

The Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of the States now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the Year one thousand eight hundred and eight, but a Tax or duty may be imposed on such Importation, not exceeding ten dollars for each Person.

The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.

No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed.

No Capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be laid, unless in Proportion to the Census of Enumeration herein before directed to be taken.

No Tax or Duty shall be laid on Articles exported from any State.

No Preference shall be given by any Regulation of Commerce or Revenue to the Ports of one State over those of another: nor shall Vessels bound to, or from, one State, be obliged to enter, clear or pay Duties in another.

No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law; and a regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from time to time.

No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United States: And no Person holding any Office of Profit or Trust under them, shall, without the Consent of the Congress, accept of any present, Emolument, Office, or Title, of any kind whatever, from any King, Prince or foreign State.

Section 10.

No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation; grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal; coin Money; emit Bills of Credit; make any Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts; pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts, or grant any Title of Nobility.

No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing its inspection Laws: and the net Produce of all Duties and Imposts, laid by any State on Imports or Exports, shall be for the Use of the Treasury of the United States; and all such Laws shall be subject to the Revision and Controul of the Congress.

No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any Duty of Tonnage, keep Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace, enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a foreign Power, or engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not admit of delay.

Annotations

Article I - Legislative Department

• Section 1. Legislative Powers
• Separation of Powers and Checks and Balances
  • The Theory Elaborated and Implemented
  • Judicial Enforcement
• Bicameralism
• Enumerated, Implied, Resulting, and Inherent Powers
• Delegation of Legislative Power
  • Origin of the Doctrine of Nondelegability
  • Delegation Which Is Permissible
    • Filling Up the Details
    • Contingent Legislation
  • The Effective Demise of the Nondelegation Doctrine
    • The Regulatory State
    • Standards
    • Foreign Affairs
    • Delegations to the States
    • Delegation to Private Persons
    • Delegation and Individual Liberties
  • Punishment of Violations
• Congressional Investigations
  • Source of the Power to Investigate
  • Investigations of Conduct of Executive Department
  • Investigations of Members of Congress
  • Investigations in Aid of Legislation
    • Purpose
    • Protection of Witnesses: Pertinency and Related Matters
    • Protection of Witnesses: Constitutional Guarantees
  • Sanctions of the Investigatory Power: Contempt

• Section 2. The House of Representatives
• Clause 1. Congressional Districting
  • Elector Qualifications
• Clause 2. Qualifications of Members of Congress
  • When the Qualifications Must Be Possessed
  • Exclusivity of Constitutional Qualifications
  • Congressional Additions
  • State Additions
• Clause 3. Apportionment of Seats in the House
  • The Census Requirement
• Clause 4. Vacancies
• Clause 5. Officers and Power of Impeachment

• Section 3. The Senate
• Clause 1. Composition and Selection
• Clause 2. Classes of Senators
• Clause 3. Qualifications
• Clause 4. The Vice President
• Clause 5. Officers
• Clause 6. Trial of Impeachments
• Clause 7. Judgments on Impeachment

• Section 4. Elections
• Clause 1. Congressional Power to Regulate
  • Federal Legislation Protecting Electoral Process
• Clause 2. Time of Assembling

• Section 5. Powers and Duties of the Houses
• Clause 1. Power to Judge Elections
• Clause 2. Rules of Proceedings
• Clause 3. Duty to Keep a Journal
• Clause 4. Adjournments
• POWERS AND DUTIES OF THE HOUSES
  • Power To Judge Elections
  • ''A Quorum to Do Business''
  • Rules of Proceedings
  • Powers of the Houses Over Members
  • Duty To Keep a Journal

• Section 6. Rights and Disabilities of Members
• Clause 1. Compensation and Immunities
  • Congressional Pay
  • Privilege from Arrest
  • Privilege of Speech or Debate
    • Members
    • Congressional Employees
• Clause 2. Disabilities
  • Appointment to Executive Office
  • Incompatible Offices

• Section 7. Legislative Process
• Clause 1. Revenue Bills
• Clause 2. Approval by the President
  • The Veto Power
• Clause 3. Presentation of Resolutions
  • The Legislative Veto

• Section 8. Powers of Congress
• Clause 1. Power to Tax and Spend
  • Kinds of Taxes Permitted
    • Decline of the Forbidden Subject Matter Test
    • Federal Taxation of State Interests
    • Scope of State Immunity from Federal Taxation
    • Uniformity Requirement
  • Purposes of Taxation
    • Regulation by Taxation
    • Extermination by Taxation
    • Promotion of Business: Protective Tariff
  • Spending for the General Welfare
    • Scope of the Power
  • Social Security Act Cases
  • An Unrestrained Federal Spending Power
  • Conditional Grants-In-Aid
  • Earmarked Funds
  • Debts of the United States
• Clause 2. Borrowing Power
• Clause 3. Commerce Power
  • Power to Regulate Commerce
    • Purposes Served by the Grant
    • Definition of Terms
      • Commerce
      • Among the Several States
      • Regulate
      • Necessary and Proper Clause
      • Federalism Limits on Exercise of Commerce Power
      • Illegal Commerce
  • Interstate versus Foreign Commerce
  • Instruments of Commerce
  • Congressional Regulation of Waterways
    • Navigation
    • Hydroelectric Power; Flood Control
  • Congressional Regulation of Land Transportation
    • Federal Stimulation of Land Transportation
    • Federal Regulation of Land Transportation
    • Federal Regulation of Intrastate Rates (The Shreveport Doctrine)
    • Federal Protection of Labor in Interstate Rail Transportation
    • Regulation of Other Agents of Carriage and Communications
  • Congressional Regulation of Commerce as Traffic
    • The Sherman Act: Sugar Trust Case
    • Sherman Act Revived
    • The ''Current of Commerce'' Concept: The Swift Case
    • The Danbury Hatters Case
    • Stockyards and Grain Futures Acts
    • Securities and Exchange Commission
  • Congressional Regulation of Production and Industrial Relations: Antidepression Legislation
    • National Industrial Recovery Act
    • Agricultural Adjustment Act
    • Bituminous Coal Conservation Act
    • Railroad Retirement Act
    • National Labor Relations Act
    • Fair Labor Standards Act
    • Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act
  • Acts of Congress Prohibiting Commerce
    • Foreign Commerce: Jefferson's Embargo
    • Foreign Commerce: Protective Tariffs
    • Foreign Commerce: Banned Articles
    • Interstate Commerce: Power to Prohibit Questioned
    • Interstate Commerce: National Prohibitions and State Police Power
    • The Lottery Case
    • The Darby Case
  • The Commerce Clause as a Source of National Police Power
    • Is There an Intrastate Barrier to Congress' Commerce Power?
    • Civil Rights
    • Criminal Law
  • The Commerce Clause as a Restraint on State Powers
    • Doctrinal Background
    • The State Proprietary Activity Exception
    • Congressional Authorization of Impermissible State Action
  • State Taxation and Regulation: The Old Law
    • General Considerations
    • Taxation
    • Regulation
  • State Taxation and Regulation: The Modern Law
    • General Considerations
    • Taxation
    • Regulation
  • Foreign Commerce and State Powers
  • Concurrent Federal and State Jurisdiction
    • The General Issue: Preemption
      • Preemption Standards
      • The Standards Applied
      • Federal Versus State Labor Laws
  • Commerce With Indian Tribes
• Clause 4. Naturalization and Bankruptcies
  • Naturalization and Citizenship
    • Nature and Scope of Congress' Power
    • Categories of Citizens: Birth and Naturalization
    • The Naturalization of Aliens
  • Rights of Naturalized Persons
  • Expatriation: Loss of Citizenship
  • Aliens
    • The Power of Congress to Exclude Aliens
    • Deportation
  • Bankruptcy
    • Persons Who May Be Released from Debt
    • Liberalization of Relief Granted and Expansion of the Rights of the Trustee
    • Constitutional Limitations on the Bankruptcy Power
    • Constitutional Status of State Insolvency Laws: Preemption
• Clauses 5 and 6. Money
  • Fiscal and Monetary Powers of Congress
    • Coinage, Weights, and Measures
    • Punishment of Counterfeiting
    • Borrowing Power versus Fiscal Power
• Clause 7. Post Office
  • Postal Power
    • ''Establish''
    • Power to Protect the Mails
    • Power to Prevent Harmful Use of the Postal Facilities
    • Exclusive Power as an Adjunct to Other Powers
    • State Regulations Affecting the Mails
• Clause 8. Copyrights and Patents
  • Copyrights and Patents
    • Scope of the Power
    • Patentable Discoveries
    • Procedure in Issuing Patents
    • Nature and Scope of the Right Secured
    • Power of Congress over Patent Rights
    • State Power Affecting Payments and Copyrights
    • Trade-Marks and Advertisements
• Clause 9. Creation of Courts
• Clause 10. Maritime Crimes
  • Piracies, Felonies, and Offenses Against the Law of Nations
    • Origin of the Clause
    • Definition of Offenses
    • Extraterritorial Reach of the Power
• Clauses 11, 12, 13, and 14. War; Military Establishment
  • The War Power
    • Source and Scope
      • Three Theories
      • An Inherent Power
      • A Complexus of Granted Powers
    • Declaration of War
  • The Power to Raise and Maintain Armed Forces
    • Purpose of Specific Grants
    • Time Limit on Appropriations for the Army
    • Conscription
    • Care of the Armed Forces
    • Trial and Punishment of Offenses: Servicemen, Civilian Employees, and Dependents
      • Servicemen
      • Civilians and Dependents
  • War Legislation
    • War Powers in Peacetime
    • Delegation of Legislative Power in Wartime
  • Constitutional Rights in Wartime
    • Constitution and the Advance of the Flag
      • Theater of Military Operations
      • Enemy Country
      • Enemy Property
      • Prizes of War
    • The Constitution at Home in Wartime
      • Personal Liberty
      • Enemy Aliens
      • Eminent Domain
      • Rent and Price Controls
• Clauses 15 and 16. The Militia
  • The Militia Clause
    • Calling Out the Militia
    • Regulation of the Militia
• Clause 17. District of Columbia; Federal Property
  • Seat of the Government
  • Authority Over Places Purchased
    • ''Places''
    • Duration of Federal Jurisdiction
    • Reservation of Jurisdiction by States
• Clause 18. Necessary and Proper Clause
  • Coefficient or Elastic Clause
    • Scope of Incidental Powers
    • Operation of Coefficient Clause
    • Definition of Punishment and Crimes
    • Chartering of Banks
    • Currency Regulations
    • Power to Charter Corporations
    • Courts and Judicial Proceedings
    • Special Acts Concerning Claims
    • Maritime Law

• Section 9. Powers Denied to Congress
• Clause 1. Importation of Slaves
  • General Purpose of Sec. 9
• Clause 2. Habeas Corpus Suspension
• Clause 3. Bills of Attainder and Ex Post Facto Laws
  • Bills of Attainder
  • Ex Post Facto Laws
    • Definition
    • What Constitutes Punishment
    • Change in Place or Mode of Trial
• Clause 4. Taxes
  • Direct Taxes
    • The Hylton Case
    • From the Hylton to the Pollock Case
    • Restriction of the Pollock Decision
    • Miscellaneous
• Clause 5. Duties on Exports from States
  • Taxes on Exports
    • Stamp Taxes
• Clause 6. Preference to Ports
  • The ''No Preference'' Clause
• Clause 7. Appropriations and Accounting of Public Money
  • Appropriations
  • Payment of Claims
• Clause 8. Titles of Nobility; Presents

• Section 10. Powers Denied to the States
• Clause 1. Not to Make Treaties, Coin Money, Pass Ex Post Facto Laws, Impair Contracts
  • Treaties, Alliances, or Confederations
  • Bills of Credit
  • Legal Tender
  • Bills of Attainder
  • Ex Post Facto Laws
    • Scope of the Provision
    • Denial of Future Privileges to Past Offenders
    • Changes in Punishment
    • Changes in Procedure
  • Obligation of Contracts
    • ''Law'' Defined
    • Status of Judicial Decisions
    • ''Obligation'' Defined
    • ''Impair'' Defined
    • Vested Rights Not Included
    • Public Grants That Are Not ''Contracts''
    • Tax Exemptions: When Not ''Contracts''
    • ''Contracts'' Include Public Contracts and Corporate Charters
    • Corporate Charters: Different Ways of Regarding
    • Reservation of Right to Alter or Repeal Corporate Charters
    • Corporation Subject to the Law and Police Power
    • Strict Construction of Charters, Tax Exemptions
    • Strict Construction and the Police Power
    • Doctrine of Inalienability as Applied to Eminent Domain, Taxing, and Police Powers
    • Private Contracts
    • Remedy a Part of the Private Obligation
    • Private Contracts and the Police Power
    • Evaluation of the Clause Today
• Clause 2. Not to Levy Duties on Exports and Imports
  • Duties on Exports and Imports
    • Scope
    • Privilege Taxes
    • Property Taxes
    • Inspection Laws
• Clause 3. Not to Lay Tonnage Duties, Keep Troops, Make Compacts, or Engage in War
  • Tonnage Duties
  • Keeping Troops
  • Interstate Compacts
    • Background of Clause
    • Subject Matter of Interstate Compacts
    • Consent of Congress
    • Grants of Franchise to Corporations by Two States
    • Legal Effects of Interstate Compacts