Patrick J Buchanan: Blowback From Bear Baiting

Patrick J Buchanan: Blowback From Bear Baiting

August 16, 2008

One of the wonders of the internet is the ability and opportunity to gather more than one point of view about current events. If one were to take the time to read accounts of the Russo-Georgian conflict from non-Western news sourses, you get a point of view that is not being reported in the U. S. media.

Pat Buchanan’s version and take on the events appear to be much closer to what really happened in a series of events that began August 7, 2008 – when Georgia foolishly started military actions that were obviously arrogantly oblivious of the possible consequences.

And then when Georgia’s efforts began to go awry, they wanted to cry foul…

See also: 20080812 Stratfor: The Russo Georgian War and the Balance of Power

20080807 Russo-Georgian War, Military Intel Watch - Stratfor, Military National Security Intel Watch, World Middle East Georgia, World Russia

_____

Patrick J. Buchanan: Blowback From Bear-Baiting

08/15/2008

Mikheil Saakashvili's decision to use the opening of the Olympic Games to cover Georgia's invasion of its breakaway province of South Ossetia must rank in stupidity with Gamal Abdel-Nasser's decision to close the Straits of Tiran to Israeli ships.

Nasser's blunder cost him the Sinai in the Six-Day War. Saakashvili's blunder probably means permanent loss of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

After shelling and attacking what he claims is his own country, killing scores of his own Ossetian citizens and sending tens of thousands fleeing into Russia, Saakashvili's army was whipped back into Georgia in 48 hours.

Vladimir Putin took the opportunity to kick the Georgian army out of Abkhazia, as well, to bomb Tbilisi and to seize Gori, birthplace of Stalin.

Reveling in his status as an intimate of George Bush, Dick Cheney and John McCain, and America's lone democratic ally in the Caucasus, Saakashvili thought he could get away with a lightning coup and present the world with a fait accompli.

Mikheil did not reckon on the rage or resolve of the Bear.

American charges of Russian aggression ring hollow. Georgia started this fight -- Russia finished it. People who start wars don't get to decide how and when they end.

Russia's response was "disproportionate" and "brutal," wailed Bush.

True. But did we not authorize Israel to bomb Lebanon for 35 days in response to a border skirmish where several Israel soldiers were killed and two captured? Was that not many times more "disproportionate"?

Russia has invaded a sovereign country, railed Bush. But did not the United States bomb Serbia for 78 days and invade to force it to surrender a province, Kosovo, to which Serbia had a far greater historic claim than Georgia had to Abkhazia or South Ossetia, both of which prefer Moscow to Tbilisi?

Is not Western hypocrisy astonishing?

When the Soviet Union broke into 15 nations, we celebrated…

[…]

Read the rest here: Blowback From Bear-Baiting

20080815 Patrick J Buchanan: Blowback From Bear Baiting

Stratfor: The Russo-Georgian War and the Balance of Power

Stratfor: The Russo-Georgian War and the Balance of Power

http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/russo_georgian_war_and_balance_power

August 12, 2008 1508 GMT

By George Friedman

Related Special Topic Pages

Crisis in South Ossetia
U.S. Weakness and Russia’s Window of Opportunity
The Russian Resurgence
Kosovo, Russia and the West

The Russian invasion of Georgia has not changed the balance of power in Eurasia. It simply announced that the balance of power had already shifted.

The United States has been absorbed in its wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as potential conflict with Iran and a destabilizing situation in Pakistan. It has no strategic ground forces in reserve and is in no position to intervene on the Russian periphery.

This, as we have argued, has opened a window of opportunity for the Russians to reassert their influence in the former Soviet sphere. Moscow did not have to concern itself with the potential response of the United States or Europe; hence, the invasion did not shift the balance of power.

The balance of power had already shifted, and it was up to the Russians when to make this public.

They did that Aug. 8.

Let’s begin simply by reviewing the last few days.

On the night of Thursday, Aug. 7, forces of the Republic of Georgia drove across the border of South Ossetia, a secessionist region of Georgia that has functioned as an independent entity since the fall of the Soviet Union. The forces drove on to the capital, Tskhinvali, which is close to the border. Georgian forces got bogged down while trying to take the city. In spite of heavy fighting, they never fully secured the city, nor the rest of South Ossetia.

On the morning of Aug. 8, Russian forces entered South Ossetia, using armored and motorized infantry forces along with air power. South Ossetia was informally aligned with Russia, and Russia acted to prevent the region’s absorption by Georgia. Given the speed with which the Russians responded — within hours of the Georgian attack — the Russians were expecting the Georgian attack and were themselves at their jumping-off points. The counterattack was carefully planned and competently executed, and over the next 48 hours, the Russians succeeded in defeating the main Georgian force and forcing a retreat. By Sunday, Aug. 10, the Russians had consolidated their position in South Ossetia.





(click image to enlarge)

On Monday, the Russians extended their offensive into Georgia proper, attacking on two axes. One was south from South Ossetia to the Georgian city of Gori. The other drive was from Abkhazia, another secessionist region of Georgia aligned with the Russians. This drive was designed to cut the road between the Georgian capital of Tbilisi and its ports. By this point, the Russians had bombed the military airfields at Marneuli and Vaziani and appeared to have disabled radars at the international airport in Tbilisi. These moves brought Russian forces to within 40 miles of the Georgian capital, while making outside reinforcement and resupply of Georgian forces extremely difficult should anyone wish to undertake it.

The Mystery Behind the Georgian Invasion

In this simple chronicle, there is something quite mysterious: Why did the Georgians choose to invade South Ossetia on Thursday night? There had been a great deal of shelling by the South Ossetians of Georgian villages for the previous three nights, but while possibly more intense than usual, artillery exchanges were routine. The Georgians might not have fought well, but they committed fairly substantial forces that must have taken at the very least several days to deploy and supply. Georgia’s move was deliberate.

The United States is Georgia’s closest ally. It maintained about 130 military advisers in Georgia, along with civilian advisers, contractors involved in all aspects of the Georgian government and people doing business in Georgia. It is inconceivable that the Americans were unaware of Georgia’s mobilization and intentions. It is also inconceivable that the Americans were unaware that the Russians had deployed substantial forces on the South Ossetian frontier. U.S. technical intelligence, from satellite imagery and signals intelligence to unmanned aerial vehicles, could not miss the fact that thousands of Russian troops were moving to forward positions. The Russians clearly knew the Georgians were ready to move. How could the United States not be aware of the Russians? Indeed, given the posture of Russian troops, how could intelligence analysts have missed the possibility that the Russians had laid a trap, hoping for a Georgian invasion to justify its own counterattack?

It is very difficult to imagine that the Georgians launched their attack against U.S. wishes. The Georgians rely on the United States, and they were in no position to defy it. This leaves two possibilities. The first is a massive breakdown in intelligence, in which the United States either was unaware of the existence of Russian forces, or knew of the Russian forces but — along with the Georgians — miscalculated Russia’s intentions. The second is that the United States, along with other countries, has viewed Russia through the prism of the 1990s, when the Russian military was in shambles and the Russian government was paralyzed. The United States has not seen Russia make a decisive military move beyond its borders since the Afghan war of the 1970s-1980s. The Russians had systematically avoided such moves for years. The United States had assumed that the Russians would not risk the consequences of an invasion.

If this was the case, then it points to the central reality of this situation: The Russians had changed dramatically, along with the balance of power in the region. They welcomed the opportunity to drive home the new reality, which was that they could invade Georgia and the United States and Europe could not respond. As for risk, they did not view the invasion as risky. Militarily, there was no counter. Economically, Russia is an energy exporter doing quite well — indeed, the Europeans need Russian energy even more than the Russians need to sell it to them. Politically, as we shall see, the Americans needed the Russians more than the Russians needed the Americans. Moscow’s calculus was that this was the moment to strike. The Russians had been building up to it for months, as we have discussed, and they struck.

The Western Encirclement of Russia

To understand Russian thinking, we need to look at two events. The first is the Orange Revolution in Ukraine. From the U.S. and European point of view, the Orange Revolution represented a triumph of democracy and Western influence. From the Russian point of view, as Moscow made clear, the Orange Revolution was a CIA-funded intrusion into the internal affairs of Ukraine, designed to draw Ukraine into NATO and add to the encirclement of Russia. U.S. Presidents George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton had promised the Russians that NATO would not expand into the former Soviet Union empire.

That promise had already been broken in 1998 by NATO’s expansion to Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic — and again in the 2004 expansion, which absorbed not only the rest of the former Soviet satellites in what is now Central Europe, but also the three Baltic states, which had been components of the Soviet Union.

The Russians had tolerated all that, but the discussion of including Ukraine in NATO represented a fundamental threat to Russia’s national security. It would have rendered Russia indefensible and threatened to destabilize the Russian Federation itself. When the United States went so far as to suggest that Georgia be included as well, bringing NATO deeper into the Caucasus, the Russian conclusion — publicly stated — was that the United States in particular intended to encircle and break Russia.

The second and lesser event was the decision by Europe and the United States to back Kosovo’s separation from Serbia. The Russians were friendly with Serbia, but the deeper issue for Russia was this: The principle of Europe since World War II was that, to prevent conflict, national borders would not be changed. If that principle were violated in Kosovo, other border shifts — including demands by various regions for independence from Russia — might follow. The Russians publicly and privately asked that Kosovo not be given formal independence, but instead continue its informal autonomy, which was the same thing in practical terms. Russia’s requests were ignored.

From the Ukrainian experience, the Russians became convinced that the United States was engaged in a plan of strategic encirclement and strangulation of Russia. From the Kosovo experience, they concluded that the United States and Europe were not prepared to consider Russian wishes even in fairly minor affairs. That was the breaking point. If Russian desires could not be accommodated even in a minor matter like this, then clearly Russia and the West were in conflict. For the Russians, as we said, the question was how to respond. Having declined to respond in Kosovo, the Russians decided to respond where they had all the cards: in South Ossetia.

Moscow had two motives, the lesser of which was as a tit-for-tat over Kosovo. If Kosovo could be declared independent under Western sponsorship, then South Ossetia and Abkhazia, the two breakaway regions of Georgia, could be declared independent under Russian sponsorship. Any objections from the United States and Europe would simply confirm their hypocrisy. This was important for internal Russian political reasons, but the second motive was far more important.

Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin once said that the fall of the Soviet Union was a geopolitical disaster. This didn’t mean that he wanted to retain the Soviet state; rather, it meant that the disintegration of the Soviet Union had created a situation in which Russian national security was threatened by Western interests. As an example, consider that during the Cold War, St. Petersburg was about 1,200 miles away from a NATO country. Today it is about 60 miles away from Estonia, a NATO member. The disintegration of the Soviet Union had left Russia surrounded by a group of countries hostile to Russian interests in various degrees and heavily influenced by the United States, Europe and, in some cases, China.

Resurrecting the Russian Sphere

Putin did not want to re-establish the Soviet Union, but he did want to re-establish the Russian sphere of influence in the former Soviet Union region. To accomplish that, he had to do two things. First, he had to re-establish the credibility of the Russian army as a fighting force, at least in the context of its region. Second, he had to establish that Western guarantees, including NATO membership, meant nothing in the face of Russian power. He did not want to confront NATO directly, but he did want to confront and defeat a power that was closely aligned with the United States, had U.S. support, aid and advisers and was widely seen as being under American protection. Georgia was the perfect choice.

By invading Georgia as Russia did (competently if not brilliantly), Putin re-established the credibility of the Russian army. But far more importantly, by doing this Putin revealed an open secret: While the United States is tied down in the Middle East, American guarantees have no value. This lesson is not for American consumption. It is something that, from the Russian point of view, the Ukrainians, the Balts and the Central Asians need to digest. Indeed, it is a lesson Putin wants to transmit to Poland and the Czech Republic as well. The United States wants to place ballistic missile defense installations in those countries, and the Russians want them to understand that allowing this to happen increases their risk, not their security.

The Russians knew the United States would denounce their attack. This actually plays into Russian hands. The more vocal senior leaders are, the greater the contrast with their inaction, and the Russians wanted to drive home the idea that American guarantees are empty talk.

The Russians also know something else that is of vital importance: For the United States, the Middle East is far more important than the Caucasus, and Iran is particularly important. The United States wants the Russians to participate in sanctions against Iran. Even more importantly, they do not want the Russians to sell weapons to Iran, particularly the highly effective S-300 air defense system. Georgia is a marginal issue to the United States; Iran is a central issue. The Russians are in a position to pose serious problems for the United States not only in Iran, but also with weapons sales to other countries, like Syria.

Therefore, the United States has a problem — it either must reorient its strategy away from the Middle East and toward the Caucasus, or it has to seriously limit its response to Georgia to avoid a Russian counter in Iran. Even if the United States had an appetite for another war in Georgia at this time, it would have to calculate the Russian response in Iran — and possibly in Afghanistan (even though Moscow’s interests there are currently aligned with those of Washington).

In other words, the Russians have backed the Americans into a corner. The Europeans, who for the most part lack expeditionary militaries and are dependent upon Russian energy exports, have even fewer options. If nothing else happens, the Russians will have demonstrated that they have resumed their role as a regional power. Russia is not a global power by any means, but a significant regional power with lots of nuclear weapons and an economy that isn’t all too shabby at the moment. It has also compelled every state on the Russian periphery to re-evaluate its position relative to Moscow. As for Georgia, the Russians appear ready to demand the resignation of President Mikhail Saakashvili. Militarily, that is their option. That is all they wanted to demonstrate, and they have demonstrated it.

The war in Georgia, therefore, is Russia’s public return to great power status. This is not something that just happened — it has been unfolding ever since Putin took power, and with growing intensity in the past five years. Part of it has to do with the increase of Russian power, but a great deal of it has to do with the fact that the Middle Eastern wars have left the United States off-balance and short on resources. As we have written, this conflict created a window of opportunity. The Russian goal is to use that window to assert a new reality throughout the region while the Americans are tied down elsewhere and dependent on the Russians. The war was far from a surprise; it has been building for months. But the geopolitical foundations of the war have been building since 1992. Russia has been an empire for centuries. The last 15 years or so were not the new reality, but simply an aberration that would be rectified. And now it is being rectified.

Tell Stratfor What You Think

This report may be forwarded or republished on your website with attribution to http://www.stratfor.com/

20080812 Stratfor: The Russo Georgian War and the Balance of Power

Monday August 11 2008 Interview of the President by Bob Costas NBC Sports

Monday August 11 2008 Interview of the President by Bob Costas NBC Sports

August 14, 2008 - I enjoyed the Monday, August 11, 2008 interview of President George W. Bush by NBC sports reporter Bob Costas. I was happy to find the following transcript on the White House web site:

For Immediate Release
Office of the Press Secretary
August 11, 2008

Interview of the President by Bob Costas, NBC Sports

International Broadcasting Center
Beijing, The People's Republic of China

White House News
Photos
In Focus: Summer Olympics 2008

Photo caption: President George W. Bush speaks with Bob Costas of NBC Sports during an interview Monday, Aug. 11, 2008, while attending the 2008 Summer Olympic Games in Beijing. White House photo by Eric Draper

8:55 A.M. (Local)

Q All right, Al, we thank you. In a few minutes we'll have more of the women's team qualifying from Sunday afternoon here in Beijing. But now, live, we're joined by President George W. Bush, who has been at these games since the Opening Ceremony. You say the Opening Ceremony. You've seen Michael Phelps and company at the pool. You went to beach volleyball, the USA's win over China in basketball last night. What are your impressions so far?

THE PRESIDENT: First of all, I think the Chinese are being great hosts. The venues are fantastic. And our team is fired up -- and so am I. I'm excited to be here. It's -- it's such a thrill to watch our men and women compete.

Q You met with the ballplayers before the basketball game last night.

THE PRESIDENT: I did. (Laughter.)

Q What was their response to you?

THE PRESIDENT: Their response was -- well, first of all, obviously these are great stars. And their response was, thanks for coming; we are really, really honored to represent America. And I was impressed by them. And of course they go out and put on a great performance.

Q And winning 101 to 70. Our time here is limited. We'll get to as much as we can. The Opening Ceremonies were glorious. There's much to admire about China's people, China's culture, and its present accomplishments. But this remains an authoritarian state –

THE PRESIDENT: That's true.

Q -- with an abysmal human rights record. In the long run, is China's rise irreconcilable with America's interests?

THE PRESIDENT: No. In the long run, America better remain engaged with China, and understand that we can have a cooperative and constructive, yet candid relationship. It's really important for future Presidents to understand the relationship between China and the region, and it's important to make sure that America is engaged with China -- even though we may have some disagreements.

Q You met with President Hu Jintao not just at the Opening Ceremony, but privately since then. Did you press him on the full array of American concerns -- human rights, press freedom, Tibet, China's support of rogue regimes like Sudan and Myanmar?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes -- and North Korea, and Iran.

Q It was all on the table?

THE PRESIDENT: Oh, absolutely, every time -- every time. And you got to understand something, Bob, I don't need the Olympics to advance America's agenda. I've met with Hu Jintao a lot since I have been the President. And, yes, I had a full range -- listen, we agree with them on a lot of things. And we disagree with them on things. And that's the way the relationship is going to be. It needs to be, as I mentioned, constructive and cooperative.

Q This past week you restated America's fundamental differences with China.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

Q But given China's growing strength and America's own problems, realistically how much leverage and influence does the U.S. have here?

THE PRESIDENT: First of all, I don't see America having problems. I see America as a nation that is a world leader, that has got great values. And leverage is -- I don't think you should look at the relationship as one of leverage. I think you ought to look at the relationship of one of constructive engagement where you can find common areas, like North Korea and Iran, but also be in a position where they respect you enough to listen to your views on religious freedom and political liberty.

Q If these Olympics are as successful as they are shaping up to be, most people believe this only further legitimizes the ruling party in the minds on most Chinese citizens. And even absent true liberty as we understand it, the lives of hundreds of millions of Chinese people are much better than they once were. Therefore, what's the party's incentive to reform?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, first of all, if you're a religious person, you understand that once religion takes hold in a society it can't be stopped. And secondly, I think the Olympics are going to serve as a chance for people to come and see China the way it is, and let the Chinese see the world and interface and have the opportunity to converse with people from around the world. This is a very positive development, in my view, for peace.

And who knows how China is going to progress? They've been through some very difficult political times -- the Cultural Revolution, for one, where the leadership actually created violent anarchy and society turned on itself. All I can tell you is, is that it's important for the United States to be active in this part of the world with all countries, and to stay engaged with China.

Q Moving away from China for just a second. During the Opening Ceremony we saw you conferring with Vladimir Putin.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

Q We now know you were talking about the conflict that had erupted that day –

THE PRESIDENT: That's true.

Q -- between Russia and Georgia. Now, Georgia is a former Soviet republic that is sympathetic to the West –

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

Q -- and that is attempting to embody many Western values. But just as you need China, you need Russia strategically around the globe. You got to walk a fine line. What did you say to Putin?

THE PRESIDENT: I said this violence is unacceptable -- I not only said it to Vladimir Putin, I've said it to the President of the country, Dmitriy Medvedev. And my administration has been engaged with both sides in this, trying to get a cease-fire, and saying that the status quo ante for all troops should be August 6th. And, look, I expressed my grave concern about the disproportionate response of Russia and that we strongly condemn bombing outside of South Ossetia.

It was just interesting to me that here we are trying to promote peace and harmony and we're witnessing a conflict take place.

Q Right, no Olympic truce in this case.

THE PRESIDENT: There wasn't. And I was very firm with Vladimir Putin -- he and I have got a good relationship -- just like I was firm with the Russian President. And hopefully this will get resolved peacefully. There needs to be a international mediation there for the South Ossetia issue.

Q A couple more quick things.

THE PRESIDENT: Sure.

Q China is a nation that warmly received Omar al-Bashir of Sudan, who has since been indicted by the International Court on charges of genocide.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

Q Then this past week they revoked the visa of Joey Cheek, an exemplary Olympian who had planned to come here not to directly protest China's government, but to call attention to the humanitarian crisis in Darfur.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

Q What's your reaction?

THE PRESIDENT: My reaction is I'm sorry Joey Cheek didn't come, he's a good man. Joey Cheek has just got to know that I took the Sudanese message for him. My attitude is, is if you got relations with Mr. Bashir, think about helping to solve the humanitarian crisis in Darfur. That was my message to the Chinese government.

Q As you attempt to press these points with them, do you find Hu Jintao not just warm toward you personally, but is he receptive? Do you sense any movement?

THE PRESIDENT: It's hard to tell. I mean, it's -- all I can tell you is, is that it is best to be in the position where a leader will listen to you. I went to church here, and I'm sure the cynics say, well, you know, it was just a state-sponsored church. On the other hand -- and that's true. On the other hand, it gave me a chance to say to the Chinese people, religion won't hurt you, you ought to welcome religious people. And it gave me a chance to say to the government, why don't you register the underground churches and give them a chance to flourish? And he listened politely. I can't read his mind, but I do know that every time I met with him I pressed the point.

Q Your father has longstanding connections to China. He was an envoy here even before we established an official ambassador's position, during the 1970s, and he is here with you on this trip. So there's a connection, a family connection.

THE PRESIDENT: Absolutely. Yes, there's a great connection. You know, I can remember riding my bike around Beijing in 1975, and it is –

Q Only bikes then, just about.

THE PRESIDENT: -- unbelievable how far this has changed. I mean, it is -- and he feels the same way. And we were honored yesterday when the President, Hu Jintao, invited my dad and me and Laura and my sister and my daughter, my brother, for dinner. It was a -- lunch. It was just a great gesture of kindness.

Bob, it's very important for the American people to know that coming here gave me a chance, obviously, to root for our team, and you've captured that, but it's also coming here is a sign of respect for the Chinese people. And this is a big, important nation. We'll have our differences, we'll have our agreements. But in order to find common ground and to move the world toward peace, it is important for this country to show respect for the people of the country.

Q Briefly, one more sports question.

THE PRESIDENT: Sure.

Q You have been outspoken -- your past connections to baseball; you used a State of the Union speech to do it, to talk about performance-enhancing drugs in sports. Marion Jones recently petitioned you for clemency.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

Q She's serving time because of involvement in the BALCO case -- one-time Olympic hero. We know many Olympians and in your favorite sport and mine, baseball, big names -- Barry Bonds, Roger Clemens. What's your feeling about this and how much do you, as an American, trust the integrity of the sports you watch?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, well, you know, let's just talk about baseball. Obviously one of the great things about baseball is we can compare the records of the players of the '50s to the '60s and the '70s, and obviously the 1990s, and it is very important for there to be a -- for the sport to be clean so that the great continuity and the history of baseball is real. And secondly, we don't want adults sending mixed messages to children, that it's okay to shoot up drugs in order to become a star, because it's not okay.

Q Are you going to go to a few more events before you leave?

THE PRESIDENT: I'm going to swimming here -- if you'd ever let me off this set. (Laughter.)

Q All right. You are dismissed.

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you, sir.

Q Thank you, Mr. President.

END 9:04 A.M. (Local)

http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2008/08/20080811.html

20080811 Interview of the President by Bob Costas NBC Sports